“When goods don't cross borders, armies will" is a well-known quote attributed to Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1850) (although in some dispute as evidence suggests that was actually written by Otto T. Mallery (1881-1956)). This quote is a perfect epigram for the discussion of the various historical trade roads: silk, sand and water. The superiority of trade to warfare as a means to cross-pollinate cultures is nearly self-evident but if the reader wishes to consider this notion as merely unsubstantiated opinion then the conversation has reached an impasse. The aftermath of warfare has historically been at least a partial rapprochement between different tribes, nations, or peoples but at a horrific cost. Whatever positive outcomes have resulted from the mingling of the conquerors with the conquered, trade is the means of achieving these same beneficial consequences with much less pain.

If all this seems obvious to the casual observer then the question must be raised, “Why do rulers let war happen?” The answer is found within a quirk of human nature which finds expression in rulers – it may even be an inevitable derivation or consequence of the very concepts of rule and rulers. This quirk is the compunction to control others. When this compunction has been firmly rooted in the psyche of a ruler, the ruler is as bound to it as is the lowly subject of the realm. Mobilizing a society for war is the ultimate act of control.

Rulers fear the independent trader. The native-born trader is able to escape the grasp of the ruler, at least until his return when, laden with foreign treasures he may buy favor. His return also harbors the possibility of importing foreign ideas which may be inimical to the reigning powers. The foreign-born trader must be allowed safe passage from the dominion lest risking a declaration of war from the trader’s own nation (not that the ruler cares about the well-being of the expatriate as other than as a political pretext for intrigue). Of interest in this connection is the case of Marco Polo and his reception in the Far East. Here we see the value of the distant foreigner as a novelty and an amusement for the king’s pleasure. The very independence of the trader is anathema to the control-bound ruler, the trader's freedom of travel is a rebuke of the ruler's need to control that save travel.

Free-ranging is not without its own risks which include banditry, exposure, disease, and possible ruin. A key distinction here is that these risks are voluntarily undertaken by the trader for the possible rewards incumbent on successful completion of the mission. This stands in stark contrast to the compulsory nature of conscription, military service, and the imposition of taxes and duties to fund the military adventures of the rulers.

The shrewd ruler utilizes the means at his disposal, whether propaganda, appeal to nationalism and xenophobia, or portraying his person as the embodiment of his people or the gods, to forge a collective mindset completely at odds with the independent trader. The trader may seem to be out only for himself, and indeed his self-interest is a powerful motivator in its own right, but for all that he effects positive exchange without recourse to violence. A seeming paradox is the way that the self-directed trader brings prosperity and harmony as by-products of his trading activity initiated for solely selfish reasons while the ruler talks of unity and strength while his plans put into practice actually spell misery and death for those under his sway!